On May 17, 2012, the Washington DC Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in the case of Atiba v. Washington Hospital Center, based on Appellant’s, Kwaco Atiba (“Atiba”), inability to comply with the applicable statute of limitations period for a medical malpractice lawsuit. Atiba v. Washington Hospital Center., 10-CV-622, (D.C. May 17, 2012). On January 26, 2010, Atiba filed a medical malpractice suit against Appellee, Washington Hospital Center (“WHC”), for services provided between October 27 and November 3, 2006. Id at 2.
At trial, the Court granted WHC’s motion for summary judgment as a result of Atiba’s failure to file a complaint within the period of time allowed by the statute of limitations. Id. In DC, an individual suing “a health care provider shall notify the intended defendant of his or her action not less than [ninety] days prior to filing the action.” D.C. Code § 16-2802. Furthermore, if “such notice is given within ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action is ‘extended [ninety] days from the date of the service of the notice.'” Atiba at 2. Put another way, if you provide notice to defendants within ninety days, before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the time you have to commence the action is ninety days from the date you provided notice to the defendants. In the present case, Atiba filed his complaint on the ninety-first day after he effected notice on the defendants. Id. The trial Court ruled this was too late. Id. Atiba argued that it is impossible to comply with the ninety day advance notice statute and also comply with the ninety day extended period of limitations. Id.
On appeal, the Court disagreed with Atiba’s interpretation of the relevant statute and asserted that it creates an unneeded conflict between the them. Id. The Court of Appeals noted in its decision that the relevant statute is “is utterly clear in its operation: ‘If the notice required under[the statute] is served within [ninety] days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended [ninety] days from the date of the service of the notice.’ There is no leeway in the interpretation of this provision.” Id at 3. With regard to the notice statute, Atiba argued that one could not satisfy it, along with the statute of limitations peripd, because the statute of limitations expires on day ninety, when the first day he was able to file his action, and be in compliance with the notice statute, was after ninety full days had passed. Id. Atiba’s malpractice lawyer argued that “since he was required to serve the intended defendant ‘not less than 90 days prior to filing the action,’ he was precluded from filing his complaint on day ninety. Id at 4.
The Court outlined the “clear day rule” where a certain action is required to take place before another action. However, the Court did not find this issue meaningful and concluded that the plain meaning interpretation of the statutes was sufficient and that virtually all plaintiff’s should have the opportunity to provide notice and “much earlier than ninety days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and will have no need to rely on D.C.Code § 16–2803.” Id at 9.
